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THE MILIEU OF THE BOARDROOM AND THE 
PRECINCT OF EMPLOYMENT* 
DEBORAH A. DEMOTT** 
INTRODUCTION 
Although directors who serve on a large corporation’s board share an 
association with the corporation’s employees, the law defines their 
roles, duties, and rights very differently. So differently, in fact, that, 
metaphorically, directors and employees occupy different spaces 
within the corporation. Employees occupy a hierarchically-structured 
precinct oriented around the corporation’s right to exercise control 
over them. In the law’s view, the right extends from the depths to the 
heights of a managerial hierarchy because all employees at all ranks 
have a duty to comply with lawful instructions, however lofty their 
position within the corporation.1 The right of control is not eliminated 
if a particular corporation structures its employees’ work into teams 
or otherwise confers discretion on them to determine how best to do 
their work.2 Moreover, and less legalistically, the precinct—a space 
with enclosures—occupied by employees is designed in many ways to 
reinforce employees’ identification with the corporation and its 
objectives in performing their work. 
In contrast to the hierarchically-structured precinct of 
employment, the law assigns ultimate managerial responsibility to a 
corporation’s board of directors.3 The milieu of a board’s members 
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 1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 cmt. c (2006); see also id. § 7.07 
cmt. f (noting that an employer retains a right of control over employees despite 
infrequent exercise of the right and that right extends to senior executive officers); Reilly 
v. Polychrome Corp., 872 F. Supp. 1265, 1268–69 (S.D.N.Y) (holding that a corporation’s 
vice president committed a material breach of duty by disregarding the president’s order 
that he report to work although the vice president claimed that he believed his presence at 
work was unimportant to the corporation at the time), aff’d, 71 F.3d 405 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 2. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 1.01 cmt. c (noting that a principal’s failure to 
exercise its right of control does not eliminate the right). 
 3. For the most influential statutory formulations on this point, see DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008) (stating that “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation 
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors,” unless the statute or corporation’s certificate of incorporation provides 
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differs in many ways from the precinct of employment. The law 
requires that board members, in discharging their responsibilities, 
bring independent judgment to bear in the best interests of the 
corporation.4 This requirement presupposes intellectual and 
emotional distance from the corporation’s management and their 
project. Structurally, directors act as members of a board and as 
members of board committees.5 Directors exercise original 
undelegated power that is not subject to the control of others, most 
particularly the corporation’s shareholders.6 
Thus, the simple fact that shareholders are unlikely to vote in 
favor of a transaction that requires shareholder approval does not 
establish that the board breached its duties to the corporation by 
entering into the transaction. As one court recently stated the basic 
point, “[d]irectors are not thermometers, existing to register the ever-
changing sentiments of stockholders. Directors are expected to use 
their own business judgment to advance the interests of the 
corporation and its stockholders.”7 
Moreover, a board is comprised of members, most not otherwise 
associated with the corporation, whose duties to the corporation 
typically coexist with other financially-significant associations and 
allegiances, including full-time employment in the past or present by 
another corporation or large institution, such as a major university. 
To be sure, all directors owe duties of loyalty and care to the 
corporation in question,8 but the operation of those duties is specific 
 
otherwise); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2007) (stating that “[a]ll corporate powers 
shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation, 
and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, 
and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors” subject to any limitation set forth in 
corporation’s articles or in legally-effective shareholder agreements). 
 4. See 2 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
§ 10:11, at 182–86 (3d ed. 2010). 
 5. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. (recognizing that directors, although 
individually subject to duties, discharge them as members of a collegial body, either the 
entire board or a committee of the board). 
 6. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 1.01 cmt. f(2). 
 7. In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 655 (Del. Ch. 2008) (holding that 
directors did not breach their duty of loyalty in approving proposed merger agreement 
containing $25 million termination fee on the basis that the board knew shareholders were 
unlikely to approve the agreement and imposing liability on directors would require 
“speculative second-guessing” inconsistent with the business judgment rule). 
 8. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) cmt. 1 (stating that a statutory mandate 
requiring a director to act “in good faith” and “in a manner the director reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation” is a mandate that “governs all 
aspects of directors’ duties: the duty of care, the duty to become informed, the duty of 
inquiry, the duty of informed judgment, the duty of attention, the duty of disclosure, the 
duty of loyalty, the duty of fair dealing, and finally, the broad concept of fiduciary duty 
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to an association of a particular scope.9 For many directors, the scope 
of the connection—among all the connections that a successful adult 
may have—is far from all-encompassing. Multiple associations may 
create the risk of conflict with the corporation’s interests or of 
indifference to its fortunes. Somewhat paradoxically, multiple 
associations may also create reputational constraints on how directors 
act in the face of conflicts and risks to the corporation, given 
directors’ wider web of business and professional relationships in 
which reputation matters. Observed a Delaware court: 
[C]orporate directors are generally the sort of people deeply 
enmeshed in social institutions . . . [which] have norms, 
expectations that, explicitly and implicitly, influence and 
channel the behavior of those who participate in their 
operation. Some things are “just not done,” or only at a cost, 
which might not be so severe as a loss of position, but may 
involve a loss of standing in the institution.10 
Thus, directors’ wider associations carry risks for the corporation 
because they may trump fidelity to the corporation’s best interests 
among a director’s array of loyalties. However, conduct in the milieu 
of the boardroom is also subject to extramural constraints and 
influences that may prove beneficial for the corporation. That is, 
widely-connected directors have an interest in developing and 
preserving a reputation for probity and effectiveness that transcends 
their service in any particular boardroom.11 Moreover, directors’ 
extramural connections may bear no material relationship to a 
 
that the courts often use as a broad frame of reference when evaluating a director’s 
conduct”). 
 9. Thus, a nonofficer director is free, absent an agreement stipulating otherwise, to 
engage in business activities that do not compete with the corporation and to pursue 
business opportunities that are unrelated to the corporation and its business. See 2 COX & 
HAZEN, supra note 4, § 11:8, at 274 (“What opportunities are so related to the 
corporation’s business . . . is answered only in the context of the circumstances of the 
particular case and sometimes depends on the particular test followed by the 
jurisdiction.”). 
 10. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003) (citation 
omitted), aff’d, 872 A.2d 960 (Del. 2005). 
 11. Along these lines, Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach observe that “a director who 
develops a public reputation as a poor monitor is hurt with respect to the number of board 
seats he or she holds.” Renée B. Adams et al., The Role of Boards of Directors in 
Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
58, 95 (2010). On the other hand, “a director who develops a private reputation as a poor 
monitor—that is, as someone unlikely to rock the boat—might be favored by CEOs who 
are looking to acquire power at the expense of the board.” Id. 
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corporation’s activities or may be aligned with it as a source of 
profitable business opportunities. 
This brief Commentary sketches functional differences between 
employment and service on a board with the objective of considering 
whether and how the research findings on diversity management 
surveyed by Brooke and Tyler in this issue12 might be translated from 
the employment context to the boardroom. On the one hand, the law 
and corporate practice do not posit that an outside director’s 
membership on a board requires comprehensive identification with 
the corporation and its interests, but much of Brooke and Tyler’s 
argument assumes that employers should structure dealings with 
employees to reinforce their identification with the corporation and 
its objectives in performing their work.13 On the other hand, although 
effective outside directors bring a capacity for emotional and 
intellectual distance to their duties, they possess and exercise ultimate 
power over the corporation’s management. Thus empowered and 
positioned, outside directors have the capacity to focus senior 
management’s attention on diversity issues, in particular those within 
the precinct of employment. 
I.  LEGAL AND FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENCES 
A. Directors and Employees 
In assessing whether scholarship focused on the consequences of 
diversity in corporate workforces has salience if extrapolated to the 
board, it is helpful to consider how boards are structured and how 
they operate. In fundamental respects, a director’s position is at 
opposite poles from that of an employee. In contrast to employees, 
directors have a relatively strong tenure within the corporation 
because, once elected (for terms of at least one and potentially four 
years),14 directors can be removed only by action supported by a 
majority of the voting shares.15 In Delaware corporations, if directors’ 
 
 12. Jennifer K. Brooke & Tom R. Tyler, Diversity and Corporate Performance: A 
Review of the Psychological Literature, 89 N.C. L. REV. 715 (2011). 
 13. See id. at 724 (“Fairly treated employees will identify more with their 
organization . . . .”). 
 14. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2008) (directors may be elected for 
staggered terms of up to three years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-06 (2009) (directors may be 
elected for staggered terms of up to four years); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.06 (directors 
may be elected for staggered terms of up to three years). 
 15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (stating that “the holders of a majority of the 
shares then entitled to vote at an election of directors” may remove any director or the 
entire board); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.08(d) (stating that a director may only be 
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terms are staggered, they are removable only for cause and not 
because holders of a majority of the voting shares would prefer new 
directors.16 
In contrast, in the absence of a contract providing otherwise, 
employees in the United States have an at-will relationship that the 
employer may terminate at any time.17 Directors’ relative security of 
tenure should buttress their ability to bring independent judgment to 
bear, awkward though that might be in the face of disagreement with 
senior management. It is also the board’s responsibility to hire the 
chief executive officer (“CEO”) and other chief officers and, most 
directly for the CEO, to determine when the relationship should 
come to an end, even when the board has operated in a CEO-centric 
fashion up to that point.18 Thus, although CEOs tend to be heavily 
involved in selecting and recruiting directors and many historically 
thought of the board as “their” board, formal legal structure allocates 
ultimate power to the board in relationships with the CEO and other 
senior officers.19 This allocation of power differentiates the milieu of 
the boardroom from the precinct of employment in both obvious and 
subtle ways. To be sure, there is no “cult” of the independent director 
comparable to the “cult” of the celebrity CEO.20 But, both board and 
CEO are aware of the ultimate allocation of managerial power. 
B. Board Structure and Committees 
How a board is structured and how it performs its work also bear 
on the contrast with employees. Much work is done by contemporary 
 
removed by shareholders at meeting called for that purpose); id. § 7.25(a)–(c) (stating that 
unless the articles of incorporation require a greater number of affirmative votes, action 
on a matter requires that votes cast in favor exceed votes cast in opposition). 
 16. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(1) (stating that unless the certificate of 
incorporation provides otherwise, members of a staggered board are removable only upon 
a showing of cause); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.08(a) (stipulating that directors are 
removable by shareholders with or without cause unless articles of incorporation provide 
for removal only for cause). 
 17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.01 cmt. a (2006) 
(explaining the presumption that employment is at-will is recognized in forty-nine states, 
except Montana, which has enacted a wrongful-dismissal statute). 
 18. See 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, § 9:1, at 2. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Adams et al., supra note 11, at 102 (commenting that “[i]t is interesting to 
speculate about the extent to which the ‘cult of the CEO’ that has emerged in the last 
twenty years helps explain the rise in CEO turnovers” and belief that CEO is crucial to a 
firm’s success or failure may lead directors “to over attribute bad outcomes to the CEO 
and under attribute them to circumstances”). 
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boards within committees.21 Federal law requires that the crucial 
audit committee be comprised entirely of outside directors.22 
Likewise, stock exchange listing requirements mandate that only 
independent directors serve on compensation committees.23 A 
consequence of this fact is a shift in the texture of meetings of the full 
board, with more time and attention focused on engagement with the 
work of committees, arguably diminishing the force with which the 
entire board might be characterized as a team.24 Additionally, boards 
discharge more than one function—somewhat in tension with one 
another—and which function is the most significant evolves over time 
and with circumstances, sometimes in response to legal mandates. For 
example, contemporary boards are subject to a general duty to 
monitor the company’s compliance with legal and regulatory 
mandates, while an earlier era limited the board’s function to 
reviewing and approving corporate strategy.25 Although outside 
directors may serve as sources of advice to the corporation’s senior 
management, the effectiveness of a contemporary board increasingly 
turns on the success with which it monitors, in particular (and most 
directly through the board’s audit committee), the quality of the 
corporation’s financial accounting, control, and risk-management 
systems. 
C. Duties to Monitor 
A contemporary board’s monitoring function necessarily 
presupposes a measure of distance from senior management, and 
arguably, from the immediate preferences of at least some of the 
corporation’s shareholders.26 This function may operate somewhat in 
tension with the board’s advisory role. The board’s monitoring 
function also suggests another metric of firm performance, which is 
 
 21. See 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, § 9:18, at 101 (“Indeed, the boards of the large, 
publicly held corporations could not function effectively without committees.”). 
 22. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A) (2006) (stating that the SEC by rule shall direct 
stock exchanges and national securities associations to revise rules to prohibit the listing of 
any security by any issuer unless each member of the issuer’s audit committee is a member 
of the issuer’s board and is otherwise independent). 
 23. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY 
MANUAL § 303.A.05(a) (2009) (“Listed companies must have a compensation committee 
composed entirely of independent directors.”).  
 24. See 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, § 9:18, at 101 (“In most large corporations, 
many important board of director decisions are made by committees . . . not by the full 
boards themselves.”). 
 25. See id. § 9:2, at 6. 
 26. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. 
L. REV. 1275, 1335 (2002). 
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whether the company has restated its financial reports or disclosed 
deficiencies in its internal controls, the latter disclosure required of 
large public companies since 2004.27 This metric does not appear to be 
one considered in the academic literature that examines indicia of 
board diversity in relationship to measures of corporate performance. 
The metric comes to mind because female directors in a 1996 to 2003 
study were more likely than males to serve on audit, corporate 
governance, and nominating committees,28 but, interestingly, not 
compensation committees.29 
That female directors are more likely to serve on board 
committees—in particular the audit committee—to which explicit 
monitoring functions are assigned, bears directly on the relevance to 
the milieu of the boardroom of the employment-based research 
findings explored by Brooke and Tyler. In particular, women and 
other directors who are dissimilar from their colleagues on the entire 
board may be especially well-suited to discharge monitoring 
responsibilities. Brooke and Tyler report that when an organization 
appropriately manages diversity in a workforce, diversity may enable 
the organization “to have franker discussions and make better 
decisions”30 by reducing “groupthink, . . . the tendency of group 
members to value unanimity at the expense of rational debate.”31 
Groupthink is antithetical to effective monitoring. Indeed, effective 
monitoring may require a perspective broader than that of the 
interests of a particular corporation and its shareholders; the integrity 
with which a corporation prepares and reports its financial results has 
systemic implications. The structural insulation of the audit 
committee from senior management and directors affiliated with 
management may buttress its monitoring capacity through exclusion. 
Its separateness from the remainder of the board emphasizes the 
necessity of compliance with externally-set norms that should orient 
the committee’s members and the company’s external and internal 
auditors. Moreover, in Brooke and Tyler’s assessment, “there is no 
 
 27. Between January 1, 2004 and May 2, 2005, eleven percent of large public 
companies disclosed deficiencies in internal controls on the basis of evaluations by their 
external auditors. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 164–65 (2006). 
 28. Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact 
on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 298–300 (2009). The likelihood of 
service on an audit committee by a female director was 7.5% higher than for a male 
director. Id. at 300. 
 29. See id. 
 30. Brooke & Tyler, supra note 12, at 731. 
 31. Id. at 730–31. 
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evidence suggesting that the interpersonal dynamics of diversity 
change depending upon the level of management involved.”32 
D. The Board and Personnel Practices Deeper Within the 
Organization 
Separately, potential relationships between a board’s 
composition and employees’ identification with the corporation 
deserve further empirical scrutiny. The board may, for example, 
strongly encourage—if not order—the implementation of personnel 
practices that develop and reinforce employees’ identification with 
the corporation. The board’s composition may bear on the likelihood 
that it will do so. Broome, Conley, and Krawiec’s respondents suggest 
that this may be so, with one reporting that without a director’s 
“insistence,” management would not have reported on gender and 
racial diversity within the company.33 Another respondent reports 
“hold[ing] the CEO’s feet to the fire on these things” and making 
employment metrics a factor in determining the CEO’s 
compensation.34 The goal was not one “that the CEO came to you 
with, it’s one the board went to him with.”35 Of course, these 
responses also illustrate that within the milieu of the boardroom, the 
CEO’s power is subject to constraints not present in the precinct of 
employment. Directors, that is, are not consultants whose advice a 
CEO may safely ignore, but members of a board to whom the CEO is 
accountable and who may redefine the CEO’s agenda.36 Further 
empirical investigation might usefully investigate relationships 
between board composition and board-led redefinitions of senior 
management’s agenda. 
More indirectly, might the board’s composition itself shape how 
employees view the corporation? In exploring how employees 
perceive a corporation’s interest in their input, Tyler and Brooke 
differentiate between superficial gestures and credible practices 
 
 32. Id. at 746. 
 33. Lissa L. Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Dangerous Categories: 
Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 798 (2011) (reporting that 
the board began receiving “ ‘data on both gender and racial diversity at levels in the 
company’ ” at the “ ‘insistence’ ” of the board’s sole African American member) (quoting 
interview respondent). 
 34. Id. at 798–99. 
 35. Id. at 799. 
 36. Thus, as advisers to the CEO, directors’ value may stem from the structural fact 
that “the CEO cannot ignore them,” although external consultants may have greater 
subject-matter expertise. Adams et al., supra note 11, at 100. Alternatively, a CEO may be 
“especially careful when it comes to those dimensions on which a director’s expertise 
could cause her to block what the CEO wishes to do.” Id. 
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reflecting that an employer took its employees’ concerns seriously.37 
Viewed in this light, is the diverse composition of a corporation’s 
board analogous to a suggestion box into which employees may make 
deposits that are never read? To a one-day diversity training 
program? Organizationally, the board is situated several steps from 
the day-to-day experiences of most employees, which vitiates the 
significance of the board’s composition. In contrast, diverse 
composition of a corporation’s supervisory workforce bears more 
directly and immediately on most employees. 
Although senior management’s position is more remote from 
rank-and-file employees, its composition may be salient throughout a 
corporation’s ranks of employees because senior management 
constitutes the site of effective power over operations. On the other 
hand, perhaps the composition of the board has a broader symbolic 
import, in light of its ultimate managerial responsibility. On this 
score, the responses elicited by Broome, Conley, and Krawiec are 
intriguing, with one respondent “emphasiz[ing] that the presence of 
female board members had been important to her when she was an 
employee,”38 and another female director reporting that senior female 
managers told her “how much it meant to them to have a woman 
sitting there.”39 
CONCLUSION 
The milieu of the boardroom and the precinct of employment 
interact in ways that deserve further scrutiny, as Brooke and Tyler 
conclude.40 Bearing in mind the nature of the duties discharged by the 
board, definitive evidence of these interactions may prove elusive, 
just as the impact of the board itself is hard to demonstrate in the 
absence of major lapses in the effectiveness with which the board has 
monitored management.41 Nonetheless, a diverse board may be more 
effective in monitoring management because “groupthink” 
phenomena may be less prevalent. Separately, diverse members on a 
board may be especially willing to refocus the attention of senior 
management on diversity issues within the corporation’s workforce. 
 
 
 37. Brooke & Tyler, supra note 12, at 730. 
 38. Broome et al., supra note 33, at 793. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Brooke & Tyler, supra note 12, at 740. 
 41. Adams et al., supra note 11, at 58 (noting that although the board’s “day-to-day 
impact is difficult to observe . . . when things go wrong they can become the center of 
attention”). 
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